Abstract-A web service is a web-based application connected via the internet connectivity. The common web-based applications are deployed using web browsers and web servers. However, the security of Web Service is a major concern issues since it is not widely studied and integrated in the design stage of Web Service standard. They are add-on modules rather a well-defined solutions in standards. So, various web services security solutions have been defined in order to protect interaction over a network. Remote attestation is an authentication technique proposed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) which enables the verification of the trusted environment of platforms and assuring the information is accurate. To incorporate this method in web services framework in order to guarantee the trustworthiness and security of web-based applications, a new framework called TrustWeb is proposed. The TrustWeb framework integrates the remote attestation into SSL/TLS protocol to provide integrity information of the involved endpoint platforms. The framework enhances TLS protocol with mutual attestation mechanism which can help to address the weaknesses of transferring sensitive computations, and a practical way to solve the remote trust issue at the client-server environment. In this paper, we describe the work of designing and building a framework prototype in which attestation mechanism is integrated into the Mozilla Firefox browser and Apache web server. We also present framework solution to show improvement in the efficiency level.
I. INTRODUCTION
Web services are the most established mechanism to support interaction between host platforms over a network. So, it is important to provide better security solutions on the web service applications platform. Although TLS protocol is widely used to secure network communication, normal TLS protocol does not handle the endpoint integrity issue. Hence, it is necessary to enhance the security of TLS communication by platform integrity assurance between client and remote host to ensure no malware or spyware is installed.
As mentioned earlier, even with security provided by TLS on the web services environment, web client have no assurance about the integrity of server platforms and vice versa. Due to that, mechanisms are needed to provide the web server with trusted features which promises high security assurance. But how about in the situation wherein the web server has been compromised and consequently violates the integrity of clients information? The feasible solutions to this issue require Trusted Third Party (TTP) involvement to verify the integrity status of the web client and server.
Trusted computing techniques introduce a security mechanism via the TPM, a tamper-resistant hardware to provide integrity protection functionalities for web services platform. Other than securing cryptographic key in a protected storage, the TPM is also utilized to attest the web services platforms configuration. The mechanism is known as Remote Attestation (RA). An attestation technique is an essential mechanism to ensure a particular platform of endpoint has not been tampered with and is in a trusted state. Hence, this mechanism will be used to guarantee the hosts trust level before transmitting any sensitive information to remote host. Then, to assure the communication partner of web services environment, the RA requires verification method such as the TTP.
However, the RA mechanism which transfers the clients system components measurements to the remote host faces some challenges [1] , [2] , [3] . The challenges include how to establish and secure the attestation channel between the client and remote host without neglecting scalability issues [3] . So, it is important to establish the attestation communication in a well-defined security protocol, otherwise, the attacker might be able to relay attestation challenge of compromised host to another host and masquerade the host as a trusted one [2] .
In view of the issues above, this paper presents the performance analysis of an integrated security solution for web services that extends SSL/TLS with remote attestation protocol, which we have proposed in [4] . The idea is to develop a framework of dynamic software-oriented and fine-grained attestation in web environment called "TrustWeb" which leverages on TCG and web security technologies. Furthermore, all the proposed protocols embed the attestation protocol in the TLS extension resulting in modification of TLS library and hence changes plug-ins in users' browser or application. Our protocol is designed in such a way that the TLS library does not have to be modified.
The TrustWeb approach enhances the current web communication model by introducing extra entities and extra steps into the authentication phase. As a result, this approach is expected to degrade Web servers' performance level. Furthermore, SSL-enabled host is generally slower than non-SSL host. This approach is expected to achieve more security at the cost of performance degradation since adding more security inevitably incurs overhead. This paper discuss on the performance analysis of the approach where the approach must minimize the performance degradation to be widely accepted by the industrial world.
II. RELATED WORK
Goldman et al. [1] were the first to propose the inclusion of attestation in the setting up of secure tunnel between two hosts. Specifically they look into putting together SSL and remote attestation protocols. The proposed protocol aims to establish an authenticated shared key between two hosts and obtain assurance of the servers platform integrity. Their protocol uses three certificates, namely, SSL endpoint certificate, AIK certificate and Platform Property certificate. The first two certificates are required for SSL and remote attestation protocols, respectively. The Platform Property certificate is introduced to bind the endpoint SSL certificate to the AIK certificate. The authors argues that this proposal lessens the process of certificate verification on the client during attestation and authentication protocol and provides the scalability and flexibility in SSL certificate and key pair management. Unlike our protocol, the SSL certificate is signed by the TPM using the AIK private key, instead of a Certification Authority.
In 2007, Yacine et al. [5] proposes some changes in TLS handshake in order to insert the attestation protocol. Then in 2008, Armknecth et al. [6] proposes similar protocol but adhere to the TLS protocol standard and allows backward compatibility. They use the extension as defined in TLS handshake for passing attestation protocol messages. The protocol is defined for mutual authentication and mutual attestation and is designed to resist replay attack.
One of the web service framework using attestation mechanism was proposed by Yue et al. [7] which uses SSL/TLS extension to perform attestation. The extension contains an attestation data, named AttestExtData and created at each client and server. The nonce in the TLS ClientHello and ServerHello message are now generated from the TPM RNG. Since the Yue et al. protocol performs attestation through the TLS extension, it is vulnerable to the TLS Renegotiating Attack. In order to prevent this attack, they proposed to add an address tag in ClientHello message of the TLS Handshake protocol. The server then decides whether to restore the TLS session key or not by verifying the tag. The experiment was performed within a simulation environment using Windows XP operating system. The client application is developed using Paros and Firefox browser and web server is operated within Apache that uses OpenSSL. Each client and server communicates with the TPM through TSS. Their framework implementation is similar to ours but the protocol is different.
III. TRUSTWEB APPROACH

A. TrustWeb protocol
To realize the TrustWeb protocol, we re-implemented and enhanced standard remote attestation protocol. Through the 
This identity label is a key features for TrustWEb protocol in order to prevent replay and collusion attack as discussed in [4] . The cert RSA(x) is used during the TLS Handshake in order to achieve anonymity from server and unlinkability by eavesdropper active listener. After the TLS handshake, the session key is used as MAC key to MAC every message being passed during the remote attestation protocol. Figure 1 illustrates the TrustWeb protocol.
Through the TrustWeb protocol, we have overcome the following issues:
1) The browser and server hosts without integrity verification cannot be trusted because secret information can be revealed to any adversary platform by unverified applications inside the host system itself. 2) The unverified applications can be compromised by malicious codes.
B. TrustWeb Framework
The overall framework of TrustWeb implementation is depicted in Figure 2 . The framework has the following characteristics:
• Attestation module is the software performing the trusted protocols and is installed in both platforms for TPM application implementations. The module is built as TrustWeb APIs.
• A client platform has a TPM. The browser application is linked with TrustWeb APIs.
• A server platform has a TPM. The web server application is linked with TrustWeb APIs.
• The browser and the web server are connected through SSL/TLS by enabling HTTPS.
• A PCA acts as the credential issuer and connected with the browser and the web server through a new SSL port 5000.
• Each platform is installed and configured with Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) [8] .
Fig. 2. Experiment Environment Setup
Based on the framework, in our prototype implementation, the browser application is using libcurl instead of using Firefox plugin. The libcurl supports NSS framework and can call the TrustWeb API easily. The CGI script is used in the web server to process the client request. The CGI script is built using C language and compiled to call the TrustWeb API. The new PCA application is built to support OpenSSL and communicates with the client and server through a newly defined port 5000. The PCA application is also implemented to call the TrustWeb API. Details of the protocol implementation are as follows:
1) The client initiates the browser application which is built using libcurl. Before the client call TrustWeb API, the client extracts nonce and session key of TLS Handshake. Besides the nonce and the session key, the client also passes hostname and port number of PCA, TPM authorization secret and TPM authorization data. Through GenerateAIKTrustWeb procedure, the API communicates with TSS to perform TPM commands such as Tspi TPM CollateIdentityRequest in order to extract AIK. Through the same API, the API communicates with the PCA to perform AIK certificate signing request.
2) The PCA responds to the client's AIK credential signing request through PCA_CreateAIKTrustWeb procedure in the TrustWeb API. The success of AIK certificate creation depends on the registered EK. If successful, the PCA sends the signed AIK data to the client. 3) After the client receives the signed AIK data from PCA, the client generate attestation data through GenerateAttestTrustWeb procedure. The client then sends the AIK data and the attestation data to the server.
4) The server responds to the client request through CGI script. The CGI performs the VerifyAIKTrustWeb procedure in TrustWeb API to communicate with the PCA. The server passes the PCA hostname and port number input to the procedure to communicate to the PCA. 5) The PCA responds to the server request to verify the client's AIK certificate through PCA_VerifyAIKTrustWeb procedure in the TrustWeb API. The success of AIK certificate depends on AIK unique identity and the PCA public key. 6) The server receives the respond from PCA. If the respond is successful, the server performs Tspi TPM CollateIdentityRequest command to extract AIK as written in GenerateAIKTrustWeb procedure. Similar with client, the server also extracts nonce and session key of TLS handshake as input to the procedure. Then, the server communicates again with the PCA requesting for the AIK to be signed. 7) The PCA responds to the server's request to sign the AIK credential through PCA_CreateAIKTrustWeb procedure in TrustWeb API. The success of AIK certificate depends on the registered EK. 8) The server receives signed AIK data as a response from PCA. The response consist of the attestation data, and the signed AIK data is then passed to the client. 9) The client receives the response from the server. The response is then passed to the PCA for verification. 10) The PCA responds to the client request to verify the servers AIK certificate through PCA_VerifyAIKTrustWeb procedure in TrustWeb API. The success of AIK certificate verification is based on AIK unique identity and the PCA public key. • CONNECT: time taken in seconds from connection initiation until ServerHello reply.
• APPCONNECT: time taken in seconds from connection until TLS handshake completed.
• PRETRANSFER: time taken in seconds from connection initiation until application transfer is just about to begin.
• STARTTRANSFER: time taken in seconds from connection initiation until application transfer data including time of PRESTRANS-FER.
• TOTAL: time taken in seconds from connection initiation until application completes.
The stages of the connection stages time is illustrated in Figure 4 . 
A. Yue-Hao-Yanan implementation
We embed the remote attestation protocol into the TLS extension following the Yue-Hao-Yanan method [7] . We modified the NSS and OpenSSL library to add remote attestation protocol into the TLS protocol. Both modified libraries utilize the remote attestation implementation in TrustWeb. The new NSS library is replaced in the client host, and Firefox browser will use this library when triggered by user. In the server, we configured Apache source code with Similar with TrustWeb prototype implementation, instead of using Firefox, we used libcurl as browser application for Yue-Hao-Yanan and normal HTTPS protocol for the performance testing. For the server, we also built CGI script deliberately for the Yue-Hao-Yanan and normal HTTPS protocol.
VI. EXPERIMENT SETUP
In this experiment, the client, server and PCA are run on virtual machines (VM), specifically the Sun Virtual Box. The machine runs Linux 2.6.30 i686 kernel and the virtual machines runs Linux 2.6.29 i686 and above. Figure 5 illustrates the experiment environment setup.
To establish the network connection in the VM, we enabled the default virtual networking hardware provided by networking adapter by Virtual Box [9] . Each VM communicates with each other through Host-Only networking adapter. In Figure 5 , all the VM OS installed with all components required for TrustWeb, Yue-Hao-Yanan and normal HTTPS implementation. On each type of framework, we run the experiment using the same VM but with different configurations as in Table 7 .1.
The experiment is automated by using a shell script to initiate connections and to time each connection. The script is run by a browser application in each of the three frameworks separately. In each framework, the script will initiate 20 connections sequentially with 5 seconds gap between connections.
The connection initiated is to setup a secure connection and no actual application process is performed. That means no actual application data is sent to or processed by the server. We record the time until the application stage because in our protocol the attestation is performed at the application stage. For others, an empty HTTPS request is sent to the server. Effectively, the connection is terminated as soon as the HTTPS request is completed.
The client machine's performance data is extracted from the machine Resource Usage information through the getrusage function in the browser application. The information recorded is the number of CPU cycles used to perform computations. Note that waiting time is not included in resource usage. Thus, only resource usage for performing local computation for the protocols is captured.
The script utilizes libcurl to time the connection stages and to capture the amount of data transferred during the connections.
For the client machine performance data, the information recorded of the script in the experiment is the number of CPU cycles. We utilize the getrusage function to record the data as follows:
• ru utime = the total amount of time spent executing in user mode (in seconds and microseconds)
• ru stime = the total amount of time spent executing in kernel mode (in seconds and microseconds)
• usage starttime = the total amount of time spent executing in user and kernel mode (ru utime + ru stime) (in seconds and microseconds) recorded at the start of the application.
• usage endtime = the total amount of time spent executing in user and kernel mode (ru utime + ru stime) (in seconds and microseconds) recorded at the end of the application.
• CPU time = the difference of total amount spent between usage endtime and usage starttime (usage endtime usage starttime) (in miliseconds).
VII. RESULT
The following measurements, as defined in Section IV, were recorded: 1) Host performance based on client time taken to process a request per seconds using getrusage function.
2) The number of handled requests completed per second for five categories, CONNECT, APPCONNECT, PRETRANSFER, STARTTRANSFER and TOTAL using libcurl function.
The 20 sets of collected data is averaged and presented here. We discuss our observations of each data separately.
A. Client machine performance
We have conducted the client machine performance experiment for all frameworks independently. This experiment was conducted more than 20 times using the script as mentioned in the previous section. The script is embedded with browser application that calls the getrusage function. The data was averaged and analyzed for comparison of each framework. The result of this experiment is depicted in Figure  6 .
Our protocol uses 62.5 msec of CPU time for local computation during one protocol run on average. This is 6.3 msec longer than a normal HTTPS connection. The Yue-Hao-Yanan protocol takes the most CPU time. It takes almost double the time of our protocol and nearly triple the normal HTTPS. We summarize the result in Table II. Based on the table, we observed that TrustWeb uses System time higher than User time while Yue-Hao-Yanan uses User time higher than System time. The slowdown caused by normal HTTPS to TrustWeb only took 11.2% lower than slowdown from normal HTTPS to Yue-Hao-Yanan that performs about 89%.
B. Performance by Connection Stages
Another performance evaluation was performed on the use of libcurl API to measure four categories of time, CONNECT, APPCONNECT, PRETRANSFER, STARTTRANSFER and TOTAL. This experiment was conducted 20 times and the data was averaged. The result is illustrated in Figure 7 .
We summarize the result as Table III which:
• Connect Time = the total amount of time spent to establish the connection includes TCP connection and the SSL handshake time (APPCONNECT).
• Request Time = the total amount of time spent to process a request once the connection is established (TOTAL -APPCONNECT TIME).
• Total Time = the total amount of time spent starting from connection initiation until application complete (TOTAL).
Based on the table, we observed that:
• For the connection time, TrustWeb is about 4.75 times slower than normal HTTPS while Yue-Hau-Yanan is 19 times longer than normal HTTPS and 90 times longer than TrustWeb.
• For the request time, Yue-Hao-Yanan is 5 times slower than normal HTTPS while TrustWeb is 39 times longer than normal HTTPS.
• For the total time, TrustWeb is 8.3 times longer than normal HTTPS but You-Hou-Yanan is almost 15 times longer than normal HTTPS.
On average one connection takes 1630 msec with TrustWeb which is 1433 msec longer than a normal HTTPS connection. The request phase is the major factor for the slowdown of the TrustWeb. It is expected that the additional time is due to the attestation protocol. Since our protocol implementation runs the attestation protocol at the application stage of the connection, the sharp difference is seen only at the Total Time.
Meanwhile, for Yue-Hao-Yanan protocol, the sharp increase is seen at AppConnect. That means Yue-Hao-Yanan protocol add more time at the TLS handshake. This is as expected because they perform the attestation protocol within the TLS handshake.
Overall, our protocol took 8 times longer than the normal HTTPS but is significantly more efficient than Yue-Hao-Yanan protocol.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents the performance analysis conducted for TrustWeb. For comparison, the normal HTTPS and YueHao-Yanan framework were configured and developed. The Yue-Hao-Yanan is implemented by embedding attestation into the TLS extension accordingly. The experiment is set up to measure the communication overhead of using TrustWeb application on the performance of normal HTTPS connection. The browser application is developed using libcurl and the web server is built with CGI script, deliberately for the three frameworks. The experiment is performed through Virtual Box environment using three virtual machines. The shell script is used to initiate connections and to time each connection, automatically. Finally, the result is captured and analyzed, showing that it is efficient than Yue-Hao-Yanan protocol.
